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Chapter 1: 
 ‘To demand to participate is…to demand to play a recognized role in a joint human activity’ 
(Baybrooke, 1975:58) 
Introduction: 
South Africa locates its ‘Soft Power’1 in the international system from a very particular 
aspect informing the language of its foreign policy, democracy (Nye,2005:5). A 
‘comprehensive’ and ‘holistic’ adherence to democratic principles in post-apartheid South 
Africa allows the country sway, mobility and a greater level of agency in the international 
system. The country arguably sits on a democratic moral high ground. Mandela (1993:88) 
articulated that this places the country at the “forefront of global efforts to promote and foster 
democratic systems of government”. Taking Mandela’s words seriously has particular 
characteristic and behavioural implications for the country. Moreover, positioning the country 
at the ‘forefront’ globally, suggesting a leadership role, creates the need for the internal 
‘democratic systems of government’ to have a modus operandi that rationalizes this 
positioning. In other words, the way the democratic system operates need to reflect what is a 
central condition for the country’s international prominence2.  
South Africa’s foreign policy decision making architecture (hereon FPDMA) is a feature 
within its democratic system of government. Its form and the way it functions should reflect 
the value commitments that flow naturally from this system of governance. Values such as 
those expounded by president Thabo Mbeki when speaking of governance ‘by the people’, 
stating that government must “work to activate the masses of the people more directly to 
participate in our system of governance” (Mbeki, 2002).  More recently the Minister of the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (hereon DIRCO), Maite Nkoana 
Mashabane articulated that as part of the country’s foreign policy it is envisioned that the role 
for South Africa in the ‘region, continent and the world’ (international system) is to ‘promote 
                                                        
1 Defined By Nye as power emanating through its culture, its political values and the legitimacy of its foreign 
policy, it is ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment and rests on the 
ability to shape the preferences of others’. This paper is concerned largely with the ideological aspect of soft 
power, the political value of ‘liberal democratic ideals’. 
2 More recently it is clear that from an external point of view the country’s democracy is deemed healthy 
compared to its neighbours (Pillay,2018:1). South Africa scores 78 out of 100 in the 2018 Freedom World 
Report which is the highest in comparison to every neighbour (“Namibia [77],Botswana [72], Lesotho [64], 
Mozambique [52], Zimbabwe [30], Swaziland [16]). Similarly the Ibrahim Index for African governance’s 2017 
report gave the country 70.1/100 for overall governance and ranked the country 6/54 African states.  
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enduring values that define our nation, namely democracy human rights and good 
governance’ (Mashabane, 2017).   
Throughout the post-apartheid administrations (Mandela, Mbeki, Zuma) there has been 
consistency on a declaratory level concerning the level of adherence to democratic systems 
of governance. The declaration extends in that the country allots itself a status derived from 
what we declare, we have declared ourselves a “leader”. As a leader it is of importance that 
South Africa is exemplary in terms of our democratic systems of governance. There ought to 
be a natural expectation that we would reflect the values we expound. This is what one would 
expect at face value. In the production of knowledge we are called to look deeply and 
interrogate. We are effectively obliged to take things as a whole and not, for instance, 
separate the claims made from power relations and interests within society. 
Thoughtful and reflexive interrogation requires that one take the democratic system as a 
whole and locate points at which South Africa may be failing to reflect the values it expounds 
in the international system (Taylor,2004:25). The ideas, theoretical and systematic positions 
expounded must also be linked to the broader social environment in order that this thoughtful 
and reflexive exercise may genuinely occur. 
Research Question:  
 How is South Africa’s foreign policy decision making shaped by the publics’ 
participation? 
This question denotes an analysis of the ‘conjectured relationship’ between the public and 
foreign policy decision making (Van Evra,1997:9). 
Subsidiary questions: 
 Where can the public be placed in the foreign policy decision making process in 
accordance with theoretical decision making suppositions (positional concern) 
 How can we characterize the role of the public? (Are the public to be seen as agents 
or subjects of foreign policy decision making) 
 What are the implications-if any- of public exclusion or inclusion?  
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Aim: 
The aim of this research is to try unpack South Africa’s foreign policy decision making 
architecture from both a theoretical and practical point of view. By doing this one will be able 
to make an assessment of the role that the public has, locating where and how it fits, its 
function in the greater scheme and its importance to the outcomes of decisions. 
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Chapter 2: Building the framework 
‘Democracies have failed to expand the space in which decisions are made democratically’ 
(Warren,2002) 
Introduction: 
Democracy is a highly disputed subject and difficult to consolidate into a single definition, 
Taylor states that democracy itself is an essentially contested subject (Taylor,31). This means 
there are an array of definitions ascribed to democracy that coexist. As indicated above one 
ought to focus on what is ascribed to democracy. Scholars broadly acknowledge that defining 
democracy is in itself a political act, each definition according to Taylor provides a different 
interpretation of ‘reality’. In international relations it is important to interrogate the type of 
democracy being advanced by a particular state, the question to ask on the journey towards 
clarity is what kind of democracy is being instituted through the state’s foreign policy 
(Neufeld,1998:17).     
This research is concerned with democracy in a substantive way. The procedural mechanisms 
that allow a state to be considered a democracy are important but alone cannot provide the 
tools for good discernment to be made about democratic participation in foreign policy 
decision making. Procedural mechanisms here include aspects such as the holding of free and 
fair elections, a progressive constitution, party system and the separation of powers. These 
alone cannot be considered what creates democracy or democratic conditions. Taylor (2004) 
suggests that factors such as the ‘socioeconomic system, state form and the substantive 
content of the state policies are what makes democracy’.  When going beyond merely 
procedural considerations one is going on a project of  asking ‘about the prospect for more 
robust democracy within established liberal democracies’ (Warren, 2002:678). Concerns 
centred on democratic participation are inherently substantive as this is a site where the depth 
and breadth of the established procedural facets of a democracy may be tested. 
Any enquiry about democracy should make reference to Robert Dahl (1998). Dahl states that 
democracy is a term that is used in a ‘staggering number of ways’, he too acknowledges the 
inherent convolution that is woven into the definitional fabric of the term. Dahl nonetheless 
attempts to flesh out an answer to the question, ‘What is Democracy?’ (1998:35). The goal 
that democracy is attempting to achieve is political equality. This goal, according to the 
author is achieved through adherence to five particular standards namely; Effective 
participation (my emphasis), voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the 
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agenda and the inclusion of adults. These are some of the virtues that democracy provides the 
opportunity for. Effective participation means that members in a populace have both ‘equal 
and effective opportunities’ for their views on policy decisions and other matters to be 
known. Voting equality denotes equality when it comes to decision about policy that is to be 
made. In this regard, all must be able to vote and additionally be counted as equal in the 
process. An enlightened understanding speaks to the fact that knowledge of alternative 
options must be known to the members of the democracy so as to cultivate an environment 
where an enlightened and considerate decision may be reached.  Control of the agenda is; an 
openness for issues to be changed as well as the space for opportunities to decide what 
matters are included or excluded on the agenda. Inclusion of adults requires that all adults 
should have full rights emanating from their citizenship in the demos (Dahl,2008:38). Each 
feature is required so as to ensure that the members of the democracy are politically equal  
(Dahl,2008:38). The author articulates that ‘political equality assumes that the members are 
all equally well qualified to participate in decision making provided they have adequate 
opportunities to learn about the matters before them by inquiry, discussion and deliberation’ 
(this will be expanded upon later). 
Dahl acknowledges the likelihood that not all states considering themselves democratic will 
neatly meet the criteria verbatim, but that it provides a way to measure both achievements 
and possibilities of democratic governance (1998:42). Moreover, the author considers the 
criteria stated useful, articulating that they are ‘as useful as ideal standards can ever be’. This 
criteria is indeed useful to an extent in making assessments about the quality, depth and 
breadth of a democracy. As with any criteria one has to look deeper than the surface to 
uncover intricate particulars that are crucial to its genesis. One needs to look for instance at 
where the criteria comes from, an epistemological question. Additionally one should consider 
history and the culture of the state to which it is being applied, a fundamentally 
anthropological question. By doing this, one can come to critical conclusions that are 
cognizant of a broader range of causal factors explaining why a criteria may or may not be 
useful to a particular situation.  
Koelble & Lipuma (2008) are rightly concerned with what they call ‘EuroAmerican’ 
definitions of democracy. This conception of democracy is used in various international 
indexes that tests the depth of democracy or the extent to which a state may be considered 
‘democratic’. The authors reckon that these methods are a-historical and a-cultural, refusing 
to acknowledge the fact that very specific histories and cultures give birth to different kinds 
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of democracy. This is specifically in the post-colonies and post-apartheid state of South 
Africa where the conditions for the genesis of democratic government are different. Forms of 
democracy for the authors thus lie squarely in history .To them the ‘real measure of 
democracy is the extent to which governance conforms to the vision of democracy worked 
out by the governed’ (Koelble, 2008:3). The suggested result of history and culture being 
brought back in to the understanding of what a democracy is, is important to note for the 
project at hand; “their democratic project involves a great deal more than the adoption of 
certain kinds of institutions (parliament, independent judicial systems) and practices (such as 
free and fair elections, broad participation, and genuine contestation). It involves the 
remaking of the social, a transformation in the character of their cultures, the creation of a 
new political history of governance, in order for such institutions and practices to even begin 
to make sense” (Koelble,2008:3). This project is concerned with the conditions of how 
democracy is made in South Africa and whether or not the democracy declared reflects the 
situation at hand.  
The Public: 
The subjects under consideration in the democracy are sometimes referred to as the demos; 
“the populace of a democracy as a political unit”. In this paper I will be referring to this 
political unit as ‘the public’, it is thus of relevance to define and therefore set the parameters 
of what one means when speaking of the public as this political unit. Understanding this 
provides clarity as to why they should be participating in the decision made within their 
democracy. An important theory/ approach that can be used when considering the role of the 
public is pluralism; one of the main focuses of pluralism according to Alden (2017) is on 
electoral democracies and the role of sub-state and non-state actors. Those under 
consideration in this paper include interest groups and civil society, public opinion, the media 
and importantly parliament in their capacity as representatives of the public. Additionally, 
one may add the legislature, in the context of this paper they ensure parliament is indeed 
consulted by the executive, this will be important for the case study in the body of this 
project.  
Interest groups and civil society according to Le Pere & Vickers (2004) are the ‘critical 
agency for creating public accountability and participatory government. Siko (2014) calls this 
group the ‘attentive public, these groups collect themselves in an effort to persuade the 
government to peruse particular policies (2014:47). Siko, writing specifically about South 
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African foreign policy (as is this study) articulates that public opinion refers to the South 
African electorate’s view on foreign affair. Additionally, the role of public opinion is located 
in the gap between elections and the extent to which foreign policy has been a concern in 
within the time that this space constitutes. Moreover this study is concerned with the extent to 
which the government takes the views of the electorate seriously at the instance of decision 
making in foreign policy (Siko, 2014:47). The media is one of the most central vehicles 
driving public opinion as well as the attitudes that decision-makers have on foreign policy 
issues. It is Important to note that the relationship government has with the media is highly 
complicated, to a large extent there is antagonism between them, even with this condition 
they simultaneously rely heavily on one another. The media is an instrument that government 
can use to spread their policies to the median voters and the media generates much of its 
content through government action. The legislature, according to Siko, can be broken down 
three ways in terms of policy processes; policy makers, policy-influencers and those with 
minimal or no impact.  
Democratic Participation: 
‘Democratic participation’ is of importance to consider prior to engagement on its 
applicability or relation to foreign policy decision making. Barach (1975) defines democratic 
participation as “A process in which persons formulate, discuss and decide public issues that 
are important to them and directly affect their lives. It is a process that is more or less 
continuous, conducted on a face to face basis in which participants have roughly and equal 
say in all stages, from formulation of issues to the determination of policies” .Simply stated, 
participation is deemed to be democratic to the extent that those who are affected by 
decisions are afforded the opportunity to affect those decision (Warren, 2002:693). The 
principle of globality entails that foreign policy decisions affect the local populace directly if 
one traces them carefully. The population thus should have a vested interest in being a part of 
these decisions at some stage along the continuum leading up to when they are made. The 
process that democratic participation is based on is diffusion and the faculty under 
consideration (being diffused) is power. The result that is hoped for through the process of 
‘diffusion of power’ is decentralization, in this instance, specifically the decentralization of 
foreign policy decision making.  The effect on the populace is that they feel a level of agency 
that allows them to have power to participate in the decisions that affect them. Democratic 
participation in this sense is viewed as the ‘equal chance to influence collective judgements’ 
(Warren, 2002:678).  
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Participatory Governance:  
It is of value to consider the type of domestic governance environment required for 
democratic participation to exist and flourish, in my view the environment ought to be one of 
‘participatory governance’. Concern with the governance environment is largely left out of 
international relations scholars’ ambit, here it will be fleshed out briefly. Participatory 
governance is ‘a regulatory framework in which the task of running public affairs is not 
solely entrusted to government and public administration, but involves co-operation between 
state institutions and civil society groups’ (Friedman,2005:4). The intention here is that 
government include citizens in various forms and capacities within the making of policy as 
well as its implementation. The logic behind including this concern in this paper is that on a 
primary level this environment needs to exist if we are to extend towards democratic 
participation in foreign policy. A participatory culture ought to exist in the domestic 
governance environment in order that democratic participation in foreign policy decisions can 
be a reality. The existence of this form of participation is a higher level of participation that is 
able to be a means by which the depth of a democracy can be tested and evaluated. 
There are two rationales for participatory government that Friedman (2005) stipulates. In the 
first place there is a recognition of the importance that the organized private constituencies 
within the public are in agreement with decisions made. Their involvement in decisions is 
likely to facilitate active support for the objectives propounded by government. It is assumed 
that one is more inclined to agree with decisions to which they were party to, this is because 
of the discursive and collective manner in which the decisions are arrived at. This is a means 
by which dissent can be diffused and cooperation and partnership facilitated on a broader 
level. The author calls this kind of engagement ‘corporatism’ (Friedman, 2005:4). In the 
second instance the rational for participatory governance is that it is a machine through which 
to deepen and broaden democracy. How this happens is that it expands ‘the range of citizens 
engaged in making or influencing governments decisions’ (Friedman,2005:4). This notion 
extends from the rationale that democracy is a way in which ‘popular sovereignty’ is 
expressed, it is the vehicle that drives ‘governance by the people’ and is an environment 
where one is able to constitute as well as shape the decisions that affect them. The action 
occurring here is an extension of the more substantive concerns from democracy articulated 
above. Friedman (2005:5) further states that it is the way that democracies fulfil their broader 
obligation of ‘maximizing opportunities for participation between elections’. It is important to 
note that there is crosspollination that occurs between the two distinctions and they are not 
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necessarily ‘watertight’ or mutually exclusive. The distinction is important nonetheless. The 
way that participatory governance is tested is through its ability to give a voice to those who 
are otherwise voiceless. Overall, Friedman suggests that the rationale behind participatory 
governance should be two-fold it should ‘bind organised constituencies to agreed policy 
outcomes or offer a voice to the voiceless’.   
Foreign Policy Decision Making: 
A country’s foreign policy according to, Breuning (2007:5) is best defined as ‘the totality of a 
country’s policies toward and interactions with the environment beyond its borders’.  The 
way in which foreign policy decisions are taken and the process undergone by decision 
makers is a vital aspect to consider should one wish to answer the main and sub questions 
posed above. On a broader level locating the role of the public in South Africa’s foreign 
policy decision making architecture requires that one to start by elaborating on this sphere of 
international relations.  
International relations authors continually suggest that the line between the domestic and the 
international is becoming increasingly blurred, articulating notion like the ‘boundaries 
between foreign policy and domestic policy are becoming more and more watered down’ 
(Nganje,2014:90). With this line undergoing a characteristic change from a solid, rigid and 
clear line to one characterised as blurry, diluted or flexible, the domestic’s (public) role in the 
way a country engages in the international system becomes very interesting. Alden (2016) 
articulates an interesting view of decision makers in international diplomacy. This is the view 
that it is important to recognise that they are in fact operating in two separate decisional 
environments; the domestic and the international. The result is that they each have 
‘distinctive set of logics that structure choice accordingly’ (Alden, 2016:22).  
In democracies there is an inclination to bring domestic issues to the conscious in the process 
of developing particular positions on international issues. The international as well as the 
domestic system usually have a propensity to conflate one another as they work concurrently 
and overlap. For many scholars the best result is achieved when ‘the outcomes reflects the 
shared interest of all the relevant actors and is in tune with the imperatives of the domestic 
environment’ (Alden,2016:22). Democratic participation calls us to an even higher threshold 
of assessment in that it is required that there be direct or indirect involvement of the subjects 
within the domestic environment in the outcome expressed through the decision.  
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The site of focus within this study will be less on personal factors influencing foreign policy 
decision making contained in foreign policy decision making approaches. Psychological 
factors such as perception and cognition are not dealt with here (Alden,2016,30). Importance 
will however be placed upon the levels of analysis that are additional to the individual level, 
particularly the operational environment. Within this sphere there is more focus placed upon 
things like ‘bureaucratic constraints, domestic influence and the external environment (Alden, 
2016,31). 
Poliheuristic theory of Foreign policy decision making:  
Foreign policy decisions are a force used by states to negotiate their space within the 
international system. By taking a careful look at this force and the factors responsible for the 
ways in which it manifests, one is better able to understand a country’s character, position 
and posture within what is often a complex web. Looking at the foreign policy decision 
making process unlocks the complexities of a state’s behaviour. Scholars use the tool of 
foreign policy analysis (FPA) to go about unwinding the various processes inherent in a 
particular decision. FPA is composed of a wealth of theories all comprised of explanations 
for why countries make particular foreign policy decisions. They all-as with every theory- are 
in a race to stretch explanatory reach of decisions.  
Some theories within the field of foreign policy analysis include bureaucratic politics model, 
rational choice theory, game theory or prospect theory, behavioural analysis and the cognitive 
approach (Alden,2014:). Before delving into the theory chosen as part of this research I will 
be briefly explicating the above theories for contextual purposes. Prospect theory looks at the 
ways decision makers choose between probable alternatives, the energy of the theory is 
anticipatory where the likelihood of a set of occurrences is considered. The probable 
alternatives involve risk and the likely outcomes are known. The theory hypothesizes that 
actors make choices on the basis of losses and gains and not outcomes, it is similar to a 
process of evaluation (Alden,2014). Game theory is heavily focused on investigating 
strategies, it deals with competitive situations. The factors determining the outcome for game 
theorists are the actions and reactions of all who are involved. The theory is said to lack in 
that it does not deal with the how and why particular decisions are made.  Rational choice 
theory is traditionally one of the more prominent vehicles used to analyse decisions. The 
assumption in this theory places an inherent rationality and unity on decision makers. The 
theory posits that there is a preciseness and uniformity about the way in which foreign policy 
15 | P a g e  
 
is executed. Cognitive and behavioural theory looks at how and why actors make choices and 
emphasizes that actors set out to achieve particular goals and how this this the thrust of 
motivation used to take actions. The bureaucratic politics model is said to be reliant on the 
ways that various departments compete when a decision is to be made. What this theory 
claims to be able to do is to isolate the ‘how’ in an effort to explain why a decision was made.  
Poliheuristic theory combines cognitive and behavioural features with the rational choice 
tenants, this allows it to have greater explanatory reach, a key feature of a good theory 
(Vijayalaksmi,2017:199). It sets out a two stage process of decision making. The first is 
where the decision maker ‘employs a no compensatory decision rule to eliminate politically 
unacceptable alternatives’ in an effort to avoid major domestic political loss. The second  is 
where they ‘employ more traditional procedures to select from the remaining set of 
acceptable alternatives’ rather than maximizing alternatives (Dacey,2004) The reason for this  
is to allow for the likelihood that not all features will all be considered before a decision is 
made. The aim of this two staged approach is to clarify how and why a decision is arrived at, 
in addition it provides a blueprint for future decisions of the same nature providing insight as 
to whether the same outcome can be expected (Vijayalaksmi,2017:199)  . An example given 
of the actors in the decision making matrix included within this theory are the decision maker 
(president), expert advisor (secretary of defence) as well as the median voter (which we can 
surmise alludes to the public). Poliheuristic theory views the domestic environment as the 
‘essence of decision’. Vijayalakshmi (2017) articulates that the ‘the political costs arising 
from the actions of domestic audiences becomes a vital part of foreign policy formulation’ 
(2017:202). This situation is much more evidently the case within democratic states. In 
essence what the theory does is that it takes the environment (domestic context) that the 
decision maker is operating in as well as the cognitive factors that would be responsible for 
the decision arrived at.   
Democratising foreign policy, the issues. 
To democratise foreign policy according to Le Pere (2004) means to ‘allow a plurality of 
civil society voices open access to communicating with concerned officials in government 
responsible for policy implementation’ (73). The case against the democratisation of foreign 
policy has typically been made by realist scholars. Realists have traditionally conceptualised 
the international system as well as the politics within it as a game through which power is 
exercised. The rules of engagement in this game (various foreign policy postures) are set, 
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according to realists, independently of the dynamics occurring within state borders. An 
example can be made with a realist’s interpretation of public opinion’s role in the process of 
democratising foreign policy. The realists believe that ‘the rational requirement of good 
foreign policy cannot from the outset count on the public’s opinion whose preferences are 
emotional rather than rational’( Morgenthau, 1978:588). It is widely recognised that realist 
argue two risks that they consider fundamental when one subjects their foreign policy to 
public opinion and scrutiny. A foreign policy that is sensitive to the public is said to run the 
risk of either being ‘disrupted from below’ or ‘derailed from above’ (Nganje, 2014:91). 
These two fairly sinister outlooks are worthy of explanation.  Derailment from below occurs 
as a result of a realist’s view of the characteristics of the public in terms of foreign policy. 
That they are, according to realists, are ignorant and understand very little about the 
complexities of foreign policy. If they are allowed to interfere in foreign policy decision 
making then it risks ‘derailment’. The second view, derailment from above is focused on the 
decision makers and the possibility of their decisions being guided according to what will win 
them favour in their domestic electoral base. The fear is that decisions made in this way do 
not meet the high rationality threshold needed for sound foreign policy decision making. 
Realists are thus of the view that foreign policy making should be left to professional 
diplomats, this situation is ideal as they are isolated from the influence that the public may 
have on the decisions they make (Nel,2005:51).  
The liberal school of thought directly challenges the above assumptions.  Liberals criticise the 
realist notions that essentially infantilize the public, the idea that the public’s nature is 
inherently “irrational and chaotic” is refuted (Nganje, 2014:91). The first dimension is a 
concept called, collective deliberation; this idea is creative in that it is based on studies that 
have found that the public is in fact not as irrational as is assumed by realists. The findings 
are that the public has the capacity to engage in issues of international importance, 
furthermore the concept is honest in that it acknowledges those spheres of the public that may 
well be as unaware as the realists propose. The solution to this is collective deliberation 
which is a process whereby “the public is able to aggregate and form collective opinion 
which is more than the sum of its parts and negates individual ignorance and irrationality” 
(Nganje,2014:91). The second refutation is essentially a critique of the false dichotomy 
between being well informed and holding a reasonable view on a particular set of subject 
matter. This, Nganje (2014) argues is a response to the realist claim that if public knowledge 
is present it is limited.  The intention behind democratising foreign policy is to subject it to 
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the same standards occurring in terms of internal decision making processes. What I mean 
here is that the values such as participation, transparency, responsiveness and accountability 
ought to be mirrored within the foreign policy process.   
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Chapter 3: Democratic Contextualization   
The foreign policies of democratic states:  
This section of the paper is concerned broadly with the way that democratic states conduct 
their foreign policy. The aim here is to make some general pronouncements about 
behavioural patterns that we can ascribe to democratic states, the central concern, in line with 
the aim of this paper, is to tease out the making process; both what the process is as well as 
what it ought to be will be uncovered. One ought to acknowledge from the onset that the 
same facts complicating the definition of democracy makes it increasingly difficult to make 
‘textbook’ pronouncements on how democratic states conduct their foreign policy because 
their conduct is just as variable as the definition of democracy. 
Alexander Johnston (2001) provides reasons as to why democratic states should ideally 
embody democratic principles in their foreign policy. The first reason relates to the fact that 
good practice in the international system underwrites the integrity of the democratic 
dispensation. Good practice for democratic states essentially qualifies the kind of democracy 
that is practiced at home. This is a way that the quality of domestic democratic principles can 
be assessed. Secondly, democracy is highly important within the global system, states that are 
undemocratic or antidemocratic are unhelpful in terms of positioning a state for influence in 
multilateral organisations. The third reason relates to international security, democratic 
foreign policy principles encourage international security. This reason relates to the fact that 
democracies are conventionally liberal states and one of the primary objectives of liberalism 
in the international system is to create an international zone of peace. An instance of this kind 
of foreign policy is the peace and security element of South Africa’s foreign policy which 
sees the deployment of soldiers of the South African National Defence Force in areas of 
conflict all across the continent of Africa in an effort to maintain and restore peace3. The 
author acknowledges however that these alone are unable to assist in bringing clarity to how 
democracies conduct their foreign policy. 
There are some essential models of democratic foreign policy. The first model is that of a 
liberal/good citizen model of democratic foreign policy; The emphasis here is on the fact that 
                                                        
3 In detailing priorities for the financial year of 2017/18 general Solly choke, Chief of the SANDF articulated that 
“notwithstanding the challenges it faces with persistent budget cuts and ageing equipment the SANDF will still 
be involved in, amongst others, peace support operations on the African continent…” showing the country’s 
commitment to maintaining the African continent as a zone of peace(SANDF Annual Performance 
plan,2017:VI)  
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states bear individual rights and freedoms, specifically as owners of property and individuals 
that accumulate wealth. The liberal citizen model is accepting of the fact that the international 
system is unequal but simultaneously emphasises the rights and obligations that states have. 
Examples here include the “respect for the rights of other states and their equality before the 
law; the promotion of democracy within states; the practice of civility in relations with other 
states (negotiation and peaceful resolution of disputes, support for multilateral organisations); 
intervention on human rights and order keeping grounds in multilateral organisations (like the 
responsibility to protect) (Johnston, 2001:15). 
Another model views democratic foreign policy in terms of its ability to transform the 
collection of states into a democratic society in a deeper sense. One of the key aspects of this 
model is a programme of reforming international institutions to make them more 
representative, something similar to South Africa’s foreign policy goal of reforming the 
Security Council to include a permanent seat for an African country. The country, for 
instance, even has a “permanent mission of South Africa to the United Nations”, in 2015 
president Jacob Zuma stated that “South Africa will use its participation in the 70th session of 
the United Nations to continue our relentless work to achieve the reform of the UN, 
especially of the security council which has a key role to play in promoting world peace and 
security”4.   
The third model is concerned primarily with procedural democracy within the domestic 
democratic dispensation; the political system as well as the domestic commitments according 
to this view, should be prioritized over international commitments. This model is of great 
importance to this research paper. The reason for this is that this view articulates that ‘ a 
democratic  foreign policy (whatever its content) is one which emerges from accountable 
processes of foreign policy making’ (Johnston,2001:16). In a country like South Africa with a 
history of deep divides along racial lines and the exclusion of the majority (as will be 
extrapolated later) this model is of great importance.  Here a proper conception of democratic 
foreign policy is one in which foreign relations take a very low priority in the allocation of 
resources compared to the demands of distributive justice in the domestic setting. 
One needs to make a distinction between two missions of democratic foreign policy, this is 
the distinction between a radical democratic foreign policy and a liberal democratic foreign 
                                                        
4 International Relations Peace and Security Briefing to Heads of Missions and Media by President Zuma, 
Sefako Makgatho Presidential Guest House, Pretoria, 15 September 2015. 
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policy. A liberal democratic foreign policy is on a mission for the international 
democratisation of states, this is a priority. The opposite, a radical democratic foreign policy 
is interested in the democratisation of international society, a broader concern. The result 
according to this view is that a democratic transition of international society will produce the 
conditions for the democratisation of states.   
The three models as well as the two missions in my view are not mutually exclusive and can 
all be woven into the fabric of a country’s foreign policy. In South Africa for instance one 
can identify all of the above within the country’s foreign policy fabric. This is why Johnston 
states that ‘the best case for a democratic foreign policy can be made by a synthesis of all 
three models’. This kind of synthesis is valuable in that it is able to keep potential 
contradictions in check while resolving the tensions contained within. In the next section-a 
focus on South African foreign policy- these tensions and contradictions will be made clear 
through examples such as the “China question” in Nelson Mandela’s presidency, the 
“Zimbabwe question” faced by Thabo Mbeki as well as the case of Omar Al-Bashir during 
the presidency of Jacob Zuma.  
Some of the important difficulties in developing principles of a democratic foreign policy 
arise from the balance of human rights and democracy. These difficulties are the constructive 
engagement rational and cultural relativism. Constructive engagement states that ‘human 
rights abusers are more likely to reform if they are treated with a mixture of contact and 
limited sanction, rather than a blanket boycott or embargo’(Johnston, 2001:21). This can be 
illustrated by the increasing nuclear ‘crisis’ in North Korea in 2017, the deep isolation in the 
form of sanctions and United Nation’s resolutions has not militated against the crisis 
increasing. A typical democratic foreign policy approach would demand that there be a 
boycott of human rights abusers by democratic states. This however is impossible showing 
that constructive engagement is an ‘inescapable principle’. It is articulated that constructive 
engagement is much easier between countries that have a similar cultural understanding of 
human rights for instance, this is cultural relativism. South Africa is interesting when it 
comes to cultural relativism in human rights, the reason here is that the constitution is based 
firmly on the values of liberalism and has a Western foreign policy orientation; despite this 
orientation the country treads carefully to not appear as a bastion of Western ideals in 
international relations.   
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Democratic foreign policies are based on a state’s liberal value systems. Political liberalists 
state that the nature of liberal societies is that they carry a fact of reasonable pluralism. This 
means; ‘reasonable persons living in such societies will subscribe to a variety of different 
philosophical, moral and religious “comprehensive doctrines” in order to accommodate the 
fact of reasonable pluralism’.  
South African Foreign Policy: 
South Africa’s foreign policy perspective needs to be understood against the backdrop of its 
history. It is largely a result of the country’s history that its post 1994 foreign policy posture, 
perspective and attitude takes its shape. The main historical fact creating the current structure 
of the country’s foreign policy, at least on a declaratory level, is apartheid.  
The backdrop of Apartheid: 
South Africa’s foreign policy from 1948 was characterised by the then National Party’s (NP) 
fervent aversion to majority rule. Frankel (1963) observed that “South Africa’s policy abroad 
is to seek to maintain apartheid at home”. Every detail of the country’s foreign policy 
decision making character was made with this specific goal in mind, to maintain white 
minority rule. The approach was multi-layered in that the NP used political, economic as well 
as military means to secure and maintain this obscure state of affairs (Siko,2014:17). One of 
the most consistent stances was the anti-communist sentiments held by the NP, this was 
largely because the ANC was backed by the Soviet Union. This importantly assisted the 
country to secure support from those in the west that were deeply opposed to communism in 
the formative years of apartheid. In his deeply detailed account John Siko (2014) highlights 
four periods of apartheid and the foreign policy postures therein. Each of these periods is 
instrumental in the post-apartheid foreign policy value system and will I will thus briefly 
unpack them.  
The formative years of apartheid have been identified as the years where foreign policy may 
be characterised as a ‘balancing act’. The prime ministers of this era were DF Malan who was 
in office from 1948 until 1954 as well as Hans Strijdom in office from 1954-1948. In these 
years there was a maintenance of relations with the west, the country actively participated in 
Cold War battles such as sending assistance for the Korean war. The two prime ministers 
were adamant on staying in the Commonwealth and had a more open policy towards it. On 
the continent there was a willingness to maintain relations with countries that were in the 
process of achieving independence from colonialism.  
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Hendrik Verwoerd’s take over in 1958 is a time in which South Africa changed its foreign 
policy tone significantly, here the country can be said to have adopted a more isolationist 
policy, what Siko calls “a ‘go it alone’ mentality” (Siko,2014:18). This attitude was signalled 
by foreign policy moves such as South Africa withdrawing from the commonwealth and 
refusal to grant accreditation to diplomats from newly-independent African states. Ties 
between the country and the United Nations (UN) worsened; the atrocity of the Sharpeville 
massacre as well as the rapid increase of independent African states in 1960 further 
aggravated the situation. At this stage the UN general assembly called for a trade and 
diplomatic boycott of South Africa.   
John Voster served as prime minister from 1966-78. His government came under increasing 
pressure from a variety of angles, the most significant coming from the UN and the political 
left of the west. Voster is widely known as a pragmatist whose solution to mounting pressure 
was to have a more outward foreign policy than his predecessor, a more internationally 
integrated approach. This policy has two central aims, the first was to build relationships on 
the continent. The most poignant way he was able to do this was to offer ‘carrots’ in the form 
of maintaining economic dependence on South Africa on  the African continent. Voster’s 
relations on the continent were surprisingly amicable; Siko (2014) notes, for instance, that 
Malawi established formal diplomatic relations with Pretoria, that Francophone countries 
such as ‘the Ivory coast, Senegal, Gabon, Madagascar as well as Anglophone countries like 
Kenya, Liberia and Ghana’ showed a willingness to cooperate with the Apartheid state, much 
of the diplomacy that allowed this precarious state of affairs took place in utmost secrecy. 
The second aim was to maintain strong ties with the west, in the 1960’s and 1970’s the 
relationship was sustained. South Africa established itself as a useful defensive wall against 
communism and maintained sophisticated lobbying and propaganda efforts. There was a 
steady deterioration that occurred in the mid 70’s where for instance the UN general 
assembly suspended South Africa, this coupled with the 1976 Soweto uprisings and the 
killing of black consciousness leader Steven Bantu Biko in police custody. This is said to 
have had the effect of ‘galvanizing global opinion against South Africa’, at this point the 
international isolation of the country began to intensify. 
PW Botha’s foreign policy was largely focused on consolidating and promoting South 
Africa’s hard power. He did this through regional military interventions, development of 
nuclear weapons and covert action. This he called his ‘total strategy’. The military and 
defence played a prominent role in foreign policy throughout the duration of his tenure, 
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Botha’s premiership can be seen as is a reversion back to the isolationism seen in the 
premiership of Verwoed. His foreign policy was unsuitable and encouraged the international 
community to increase sanctions, withdraw investments and refuse to rollover loans. The 
economy was on the brink of collapse as he did this whilst simultaneously increasing his 
military spending. Botha tried to hold African states to economic ransom but these efforts 
were quickly thwarted by those states. His famous Rubicon speech in which he was expected 
to announce the release of Nelson Mandela as well as the unbanning of the ANC created 
further isolation from the international community and catalysed economic downturn for the 
country. 
The dawn of Democracy: A fresh Foreign policy value system    
Values are the bedrock of a country’s foreign policy; they are the point from which the 
foundation of the foreign policy is built as well as its eventual framework. To me, there are 
three distinct advantages with understanding the values of a country’s foreign policy; firstly, 
they are a “code” through which a state’s foreign policy decision on particular issues can be 
forecasted to a large degree. Secondly, values have the ability to assist us in understanding 
and appreciating a foreign policy decision, a sort of sense-making characteristic, and thirdly 
values are assistive in assessing the congruence of particular decisions. In essence, is a 
decision made in harmony with what they country stands for? A reflective characteristic.   
The overarching values/principles that are instrumental to South Africa’s post-apartheid 
foreign policy are a product of the above stated past in which the primary objective was to 
maintain an inhumane domestic state of affairs. This period in the country’s history was 
characterised by gross human rights violations and deeply entrenched exclusion of the 
majority through severely undemocratic practices. The international community had 
denounced apartheid and characterised it as a crime against humanity identifying the country 
as a pariah state. De Grunchy states that this was the case because ‘it made personal identities 
and differences absolute, thereby denying common humanity and, in the process, degrading 
the identity people had; in short dehumanising them’ (De Grunchy, 2006:48).  
The immediate task was to recast South Africa’s foreign policy identity, the first and third 
principles of Mandela’s six principles of South Africa’s foreign policy shed light on the 
character of the construction and reconstruction of South Africa’s foreign policy (Grant, 
2017:13). The first is that “issues of human rights are central to international relations and 
understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing the economic social and 
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environmental”; and the third that “considerations of justice and respect for international law 
should guide relations between nations” (Mandela,1993:87). A decision such as the one to 
join the ICC, ratify the Rome statute and implement it is consistent with these principles5. 
South Africa’s governing party, the African National Congress (ANC) has-since winning the 
first democratic elections in 1994-held the perception that the country’s foreign policy is 
based on democratic principles/values as well as democratic practices (Van Wyk, 2012:79). 
Additionally, the party articulated a foreign policy that promoted multilateralism, human 
rights, peace; international law and African interests (Mandela, 1993).These, according to 
Qobo were to form the lifeblood of the new administration. Barber states that the ‘core 
concern’ is the pursuit of human rights which can be interpreted as including four spheres; 
economic, social, environmental as well as political. For the ANC there is a direct link 
between these core concerns and promoting democracy, the belief is that lasting solutions to 
the plethora of international problems can only be achieved through the active promotion of 
democracy.  
One of the central by-products of this perception has been the desire to place the ‘people first’ 
or ‘batho-pele’, Mzukisi Qobo (2016) articulates that this notion exists in an effort to 
emphasise the position that the government exists primarily to  ‘discharge its responsibilities 
to the people’(2016:423). This value is of central importance to the current project6. The 
future governing party in their discussion document of 1993 stipulated that foreign policy 
‘belongs to the South African People’. In the principles section of this document it is 
articulated that they hold “A belief that our foreign relations must mirror our deep 
commitment to the consolidation of a democratic South Africa” .One of the most important 
values that encapsulates much of the above for the ANC is Ubuntu defined as; ‘a value-set 
that views the existence of an individual as deeply woven into a social structure founded on 
humanism and collective ways of being that are mostly associated with African social 
systems (Qobo,2016:424). On a declaratory level South Africa stipulates a foreign policy that 
places emphasis on the values of Ubuntu, this is said to be expressed ‘in terms of  a liberal-
democratic-egalitarian framework’. The value of Ubuntu is deeply entrenched in the 
country’s foreign policy posture. In the 2011 white papers the country’s diplomatic posture is 
                                                        
5 see the implementation of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 OF 2002 
6    See Foreign policy in a New Democratic South Africa, 
Special report back to the nation document integrated democratic Governance: a restructured presidency at 
work, 
Department of International relations and cooperation strategic plan 2013-2018  
Department of international Relations and Cooperation, revised strategic plan 2015-2020 
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described as the ‘diplomacy of Ubuntu’, Ubuntu it says is a ‘way of defining who we are 
(domestic) and how we relate to others (international)’ 
Other values articulated in the most recent strategic plan of DIRCO (2015-2020) include 
patriotism, loyalty, dedication, Ubuntu and Constitutional values (section 10). Much of the 
motivation behind South Africa’s foreign policy is to ‘actively promote and contribute to 
sustainable development, democracy, rule of law, human rights as well as peace and security, 
these in their essence are values. An example may be the pseudo-coup or as some writers 
have articulated a “non-coup-coup”, occurring in Zimbabwe in November 2017 (Specter, 
2017). The response to this by the president of South Africa (a foreign policy decision) to 
send an envoy is motivated and informed by the these values, the actions taken are an effort 
to ensure that democratic principles are upheld, that the rule-of law is what pervades in the 
situation, that human rights are respected across the board especially for the lives of civilians 
and an effort to ensure peace and security is maintained.  
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Chapter 4: An analysis of foreign policy decision making behaviour in South Africa 
through case studies. 
A foreign policy decision in the midst of “Madiba Magic”: 
This section aims to look at instances where the complications of democratic foreign policy 
decision making displayed themselves in post-apartheid South Africa. The objective is for the 
examples used to align themselves with fulfilling the aim of the current project. The focus in 
the examples is the extent to which the public weighed in or added weight to the eventual 
foreign policy decisions. 
South Africa’s first major post-apartheid foreign policy decision has been called the ‘two 
Chinas’ dilemma, the Chinese Dilemma (Breytenbach,1994) or South Africa’s ‘Chinese 
puzzle’(Alden,2001). The essence of this decision was a debate as to whether or not to 
diplomatically recognise the Republic of China (ROC), in Taiwan seated in Tapei; or the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), located on the mainland, seated in Beijing.  
Breytenbach (1994:50) assists in giving clarity to the perspectives of the two parties 
concerned. The problem lay in the fact that the PRC government claimed to represent the 
whole of China. They regarded Taiwan as merely a province with the ROC government being 
the local authority there, the PRC wanted unification on their own terms and Taiwan was to 
be treated in the manner of Hong Kong, as an administrative region. This boils down to the 
fact that, in their view, the ROC was a none-state. 
The ROC regarded China as separated between two Chinese entities. From their point of 
view they had been independent since 1912 and were forced out during the communist take-
over in 1949. Their view was that ultimately the two entities should be unified peacefully, for 
the time being they were of the notion that they should both be able to exist in the 
international community as separate entities. Breytenbach states that this view was much less 
‘dogmatic than that of the PRC’ (Breytenbach, 1995:50).    
The significance of this decision lies more in the way the decision was made than what was 
the final conclusion; the decision making process to a large extent brought out the elements 
of the new regime’s democratic character. As Alden (2001) states, it ‘shed light into the 
policy decision making process in South Africa’.  
The new democratic dispensation meant that the foreign policy decision making process 
opened up. The result being that there was an unprecedented amount of public debate as well 
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as an array of factions in society weighing in on the matter. The plethora of opinions on the 
decision making table led to the recognition question being highly divisive. There are a few 
issues which the question revolved around, these are as follows. ‘the degree to which human 
rights should determine a nation’s foreign policy, the degree to which trade promotion and 
local development needs should determine a nation’s foreign policy, the relative importance 
accorded to traditional allies during the liberation/pariah era, the relative importance that 
financial support for political parties should have in influencing a nation’s foreign policy’ 
(Alden,2001:124). The issues here would often conflate with one another during the debate, 
which issue to prioritize also proved difficult to consolidate. Juxtaposing China’s human 
rights record with the potential consumer market for instance was of difficulty to bring to 
bear. As stated above, Foreign policy decision making theory recognises that there are two 
environments in which the decision makers operate, the domestic and the international 
(Alden,2016:22). As will be shown this reality was even more apparent in terms of this 
decision, bringing the theoretical presuppositions to life. 
Of particular interest, especially in terms of this project is the role of interest groups in 
influencing foreign policy, in this case their role was major. Academic and foreign policy 
institutions such as the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) and the 
Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) made use of the open environment in order to contribute 
to the decision to a degree that had been unheard of.  Other groups such as labour and 
business also weighed in on the debate, unions such as the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), although siding with their alliance partner the ANC did voice concerns 
regarding competition with the cheaper labour of China, showing that even within the 
decision making circle there were rifts. The business community also formed a channel 
through which to develop their own opinion. Alden states that trade with Taiwan was indeed 
a factor for some businesses but the larger market provided by China made it a considerably 
more attractive option. The general consensus was that the market options provided by China 
exceeded those of Taiwan (Alden, 2001:126).Other authors echo this sentiment stating that 
the PRC provided vast trade opportunities and would become an economic superpower in the 
next century (Breytenbach,1994:56). In addition to these actors there is what is termed the 
‘activist position’, this was assumed by foreign actors. Taiwan made use of chequebook 
diplomacy in order to persuade influential individuals. The media was also drawn in, it is said 
that they were treated to visits to the ROC in order that coverage of the Taiwanese experience 
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received visibility in the country’s news outlets. The academic as well as research community 
were drawn in through sponsorship of conferences, publications as well as trips to Taiwan. 
What Alden (2001) calls ‘the anatomy of the decision’, which is essentially the way in which 
the decision was structured is divided into three phases. The first phase of the decision saw a 
particular moved being made, from the decision being merely a formality to one where the 
bulk of opinion was that the status quo should be maintained. This period spans from 1994 to 
December 1995. There is a particular change that must be noted; this change can be noted in 
the movement from statements that saw it as inevitable that China would be recognised to a 
more rigid criteria that would determine the shape of the relationship with China. This period 
culminated in President Nelson Mandela stating that the country does not draw a distinction 
between the two Chinas and that South Africa would not cancel any diplomatic relations 
unless one of the countries had done something that warrants this kind of a move. At this 
point it was stated that the country would not cancel diplomatic relations with the ROC. 
The second phase of the decision making process was a period in which the South African 
government attempted to push for ‘dual recognition’. The aim of this was to have concurrent 
diplomatic representation of both China and Taiwan. This period lasted until August of 1996. 
The idea was that Mandela’s unique prestige and prowess would allow the country to do 
something that had not been done before, recognise the China’s simultaneously. Many other 
countries had previously failed in attempts at dual recognition, “Grenada in 1989, Nicaragua 
in 1990, South Korea in 1992 and Burkina Faso in 1994 (Breytenbach,1994:57).The PRC 
was averse to this decision and maintained the line of a ‘one China’ policy whilst the ROC 
was more concerned purely with maintenance of diplomatic relations whether or not this 
meant concurrent recognition or singular recognition. In the third phase of the decision 
making process there was certainty on the part of the South African foreign policy 
community in terms of the position on recognition. At this stage there were two sides to the 
debate on recognition. The one side was a cluster of relevant parties which included the 
department of foreign affairs, the departments of trade and industry as well as the 
parliamentary portfolio committee on foreign affairs, the other side was President Mandela 
who maintained his unequivocal position of maintaining the status quo.  
The decision to officially recognise China was taken without the knowledge of the foreign 
policy cluster or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his statement the president stated that to 
maintain relations with Taiwan was something that was inconsistent with the foreign policy 
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goal of increasing activism in international organisations. South Africa would therefore 
formally recognise China. A standard through which to assess the democratic quality of the 
decision making process is whether ‘the outcomes reflects the shared interest of all the 
relevant actors and is in tune with the imperatives of the domestic environment’ 
(Alden,2016). The process seems to have reflected the shared interests of all the relevant 
actors but the nature of the way the decision was finally made seems to a large extent to 
ignore the openness and plurality of the process. It is plain to see that even and although the 
framework of the decision is characteristic of democratic foreign policy making in the sense 
of how inclusive it was, the final decision seems to a large extent to have contradicted the 
path towards it.  
Quiet diplomacy: An approach towards Zimbabwe   
The most pervasive foreign policy issue in the tenure of Thabo Mbeki was that of Zimbabwe 
and the foreign policy approach adopted of ‘quiet diplomacy’ (the Zimbabwe issue). This 
issue is relevant to briefly unpack as it is essentially a site where the fibre of South Africa’s 
democratic foreign policy character was tested. The values underlying the country’s foreign 
policy were put through a ‘quality check’ of sort through the Zimbabwe issue. The central 
issue here was a clear inability to make progress towards solving the political and economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe.  
The political issue began in the 1990’s where an anti-government coalition which included 
labour, civil society, urbanites as well as white business interests banded together and formed 
the Movement of for Democratic Change (MDC), this was an opposition party to the ruling 
Zimbabwe African National Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). There are a few politically 
significant occurrences worthy of mention; In February of 2000 the MDC movement 
managed to oppose and defeat a draft constitution that was to consolidate power in the office 
of the presidency, following this, the MDC managed to secure 57 out of 120 seats in 
parliament, this had a drastic effect on the power of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. The 
reaction on the part of government to these losses was unprecedented, the government set off 
on a violent rampage targeting supporters of the MDC . Many died in the subsequent eight 
years as a result (Siko,2014:43). The political effect then spilled over into the economy, 
Harare adopted a policy of violently expropriating land from the white commercial farmers 
without compensation. This move-from Mugabe’s version- was based on the fact that Britain 
did not fulfil their commitment to fund land distribution in Zimbabwe because they did not 
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want to dispossess their own ‘kith and kin’ (the white farmers) (Givisser,2007:440). The truth 
was that Britain had already given the country 44 million pounds for distribution but ceased a 
second flow of 36 million pounds because they believed it was going into the pockets of the 
Mugabe kleptocracy, they would not fund the project further until sufficient controls were put 
in place.  
Mbeki disapproved of the violent manner in which the land was being appropriated but 
supported Mugabe. Mbeki’s belief was that the only reason white South Africa and the West 
had a negative approach towards Mugabe was that the victims were white farmers and not 
nameless black masses7 .The country makes a lot of its revenue on agricultural exports and 
was thus affected badly by this move, internally food insecurity rose.  
According to Hank (2010) this pushed the country over the edge into economic collapse. Siko 
articulates that ‘the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the country’s economy 
contracted by 40 percent between 2000 and 2007’. The tax based withered as many skilled 
workers left the country and foreign investment thinned drastically.  The country’s collapse 
affected South Africa in a more complicated way, on the one hand there were companies like 
Eskom and Sasol suffering as a result of unpaid bills from Zimbabwe. Additionally there was 
also a crisis in terms border regulation as a result of the increase in refugees from Zimbabwe.  
On the other hand there was an influx of skilled workers as well as an R8 Billion increase in 
export goods to Zimbabwe. The collapse of Zimbabwe was to a large extent beneficial to the 
South African economy. 
The South African public as well as the international community placed a significant amount 
of pressure on the government because of the approach it took towards the debilitating 
situation in Zimbabwe. There was a cluster of society which included political oppositions 
like the Democratic Alliance, churches, the press, labour and civil society that condemned the 
approach of quiet diplomacy. Pretoria had made a foreign policy ‘mistake’ in their approach 
towards human rights abuses in Nigeria in 1995 and thus decided to approach the situation in 
Zimbabwe differently. This is why Hamill (2009:375) articulates that the ‘the country’s 
foreign policy makers felt that they had been exposed and even humbled in their previous 
attempts at intervention in Africa under Mandela”. If South Africa acted unilaterally and 
                                                        
7 Mbeki is quoted in an interview as having said “A million people die in Rwanda and do white South Africans 
Care? Not a bit. You talk to them about the disaster in Angola, to which the apartheid regime contributed, and 
they’re not interested. Let’s talk about Zimbabwe. Does anyone want to talk about the big disaster in 
Mozambique, from which they are still recovering? No. Let’s talk about Zimbabwe. You say to them look what 
is happening in the Congo. No, no, no let’s talk about Zimbabwe. Why? Its because 12 white people died.    
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forcibly it would be a confirmation of the suspicions that the rest of the continent had that the 
country had hegemonic ambitions and additionally that the country was an agent of the West 
on the continent (Hamill, 2009:377). Mbeki opted out of making overt, aggressive and 
confrontational remarks on the Zimbabwe issue. What he chose instead was an approached 
characterized as ‘quiet diplomacy’. This is essentially what Siko calls a ‘behind the scenes 
process’. Pretoria would not act in isolation on the African continent again. One of the 
primary reasons that this approach was adopted was the character of foreign policy decisions 
during Mbeki’s presidency, many authors have articulated that foreign policy was isolated in 
the office of the presidency. Leaders of the alliance partners also reiterated this state of 
affairs8. Mark Gevisser drives this point home in saying that “it is true that Mandela had run a 
small decentralised outfit which Mbeki increased dramatically, establishing a newly 
rebranded ‘Presidency’ as the central node of all policy formulation and co-ordination 
(especially foreign policy)…” (2007:714).  
With policy-making taking on this character, the Zimbabwe situation was in a very real and 
genuine sense the prerogative of the president. Gevisser in conversation with Mbeki locates 
what he calls ‘Subterranean currents at work’ that lay at the foundation of the president’s 
quiet diplomacy. It seems clear that there was a strong influence of notion of kith and kin. 
What the author means here is that “if whites reviled Mugabe solely because of what he had 
done to their kith and kin, then Mbeki himself seemed to be driven by an atavistic loyalty to 
Mugabe, a ‘father’-even if exasperating, even if dangerous within the family of freedom 
fighters’ (Givisser,2007:441).This is what Hoffman calls the ‘National Liberator Narrative’  
.The leader of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangarai was treated as outside of this family, having no 
‘struggle credentials’. Mbeki additionally believed that any heavy handed intervention in 
Zimbabwe would lead to a raise in tension between the Shona and Ndebele.  
Hamill and Hoffman flesh out an interesting paradox that quiet diplomacy created. At the 
time there was a heavy sway towards liberal governance and the entrenchment of liberal 
values in Africa, these were evidently prioritised in the multilateral organs such as the 
African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as the 
New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).These values were championed by 
Mbeki in these organisations, through his African renaissance foreign policy philosophy but- 
                                                        
8 The leader of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi stated that under Mbeki both the ANC and South Africa were 
drifting towards a dictatorship. General Secretary of the SACP Blade Nzimande stated that the presidency is 
overly powerful and concentrated and further stated that our ‘our democracy is excessively presidential’ 
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as evidenced in his quit diplomatic approach towards Zimbabwe- were  difficult to translate 
into practice. The paradox lies in these values existing against the backdrop of a situation of 
‘political repression, economic disintegration and social collapse (Hamill,2009:)’. 
As previously mentioned, the country’s foreign policy is said to be based on democratic 
principles, values and practices, the extent to which this declaration translates into reality is 
of central importance to this study. Many authors articulate that the governments since the 
dawn of democracy in 1994 have espoused a foreign policy characterised as state-centric, 
rather than one characterised as more democratic, open and plural. Van Wyk states that ‘on a 
declaratory level, the demos, or people are referred to, but they are not included in the 
practice of foreign policy’. This state of affairs stems from the nature of democracy in South 
Africa; the new democracy of the country has not been able to make the participatory gains 
that it had hoped for. Reasons for this are multifaceted. Scholars articulate that the nature of 
South African democracy can be described as involving a ‘mixture of competitive elitist 
democracy’ with a heavy emphasis on clientelism and corporatism as mentioned above. 
Reflections: 
The foreign policy decision regarding the “two China’s” in Mandela’s presidency illustrates 
the above notions to a certain degree. One can surmise that this important foreign policy issue 
was opened up to the public for contemplation within the process of decision making. Many 
levels of society were allowed space to weigh in on the matter and make their perspectives 
part of the structure of the decision. In my view- and something that is not necessarily clearly 
articulated in the literature- one needs to be highly cognisant of the time of this particular 
decision. The decision was contemplated within what the phase subsequent to the birth of 
South Africa’s new democracy, its infancy. Additionally the ruling ANC and its leader had 
recently clearly articulated a foreign policy decision making behaviour that needed to live up 
to itself.  
The process leading up to the decision proved to be difficult to consolidate in as open a 
manner as had been professed in the foreign policy documents of the preceding years. Alden 
states for instance that ‘the difficulties experienced by the South African government in 
managing interest groups was primarily a reflection of its unfamiliarity with the complex 
terrain of democratic decision-making as well as an acute uncertainty stemming from the 
teething pains (a by-product product of infancy) of the transformation. Opening the 
previously closed process of foreign policy making to the wider public was not as easy as 
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anticipated. The government did their best to place a new FPDM character within the 
democratic society but ultimately seemed to have opened up the process merely to dress the 
fox in sheep’s skin.  Ultimately as stated above the president made the final clarion call and 
so catalysed a foreign policy decision making culture that excludes the public from the stage 
in the practice of FPDM. 
The foreign policy posture towards Zimbabwe during the Mbeki presidency is much more 
illustrative of the extent to which foreign policy declarations- that the policy decision is made 
democratically and such- does not necessarily translate into reality in a South African 
context. The reality of foreign policy decisions being ‘isolated in the office of the presidency’ 
or that decisions are made executively is starkly illustrated by the manner in which this 
decision transpired.  
It is worth noting that although public opinion was strong from various corners of society- 
one could say they weighed in- on the decided approach of quiet diplomacy towards 
Zimbabwe but the reality is that the public added no weight. The Mbeki presidency was 
characterised by a personalisation of foreign policy decisions and some of the reasons as 
articulated by Givisser concerning this are indicative of this attribute. Furthermore, one sees a 
particularly strong enforcement of ‘people first’/’batho pele’ during this presidency, this is 
the case against the backdrop of what was really a more selfish, single minded behaviour 
when it came to foreign policy decisions. 
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Chapter 5: South Africa’s relationship with the International Criminal Court: a foreign 
policy quandary. 
The preceding chapters of this paper were essentially the various organs forming part of the 
body of this assignment. The foundational organs built in the first and second chapter created 
channels through which the suppositions in the third chapter could flow. What has precede 
this chapter tried to create a platform on which the full body of this paper could be 
established. It is to the crux of this dissertation that I now turn. 
The International Criminal Court and South Africa:  
The ICC was established on the 17th of July 1998. Hunt (2004) states that this court was 
established close to a century after it had initially been raised for discussion and is 
characterised as the fourth major step in the international justice system. The first being the  
Nuremberg trials, the second is the establishment of the United Nations International 
Tribunal For the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia9. The third crucial 
move for the vehicle of international criminal justice was when in Arusha Tanzania there was 
a criminal tribunal created by the UN for the crimes against humanity committed in the 
Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (Hunt, 2004:57). The fourth and most comprehensive step for the 
vehicle of international criminal justice was the establishment of the ICC, the founding 
document of the court is called the Rome Statute and was adopted by 120 states, the statute 
was then ratified by 60 states including South Africa on the 1st of July 2002. It is important to 
note that the court does not have retroactive jurisdiction and can thus only deal with crimes 
committed after this date.  
The ICC functions as a body tasked with investigating and putting to trial individuals that 
have been charged with the gravest and most severe crimes affecting humanity. These crimes 
include war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity as well as crimes of aggression. The 
court describes its participation in the global fight to end impunity stating that it aims to 
function as an institution that helps the above mentioned crimes to never happen again 
through prosecution of perpetrators. The ICC is a court of last resort and functions to 
complete national courts. The court is designed to be a support to domestic justice systems, 
the preamble of the Rome statute describes the relationship between it and domestic courts as 
                                                        
9 As the name suggest the mandate of this tribunal, according to UN resolution 827 (1993), was to prosecute 
and punish persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the then 
continuing war in Yugoslavia  
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complimentary. This principle is fundamental to understand as it denotes that national courts 
should function as the court of first instance, this in my opinion, allows that states cultivate 
values in their societies in which the above mentioned crimes are intolerable (Du Plessis, 
2008:1). 
It is upon this value that the reason the court was important to South Africa becomes 
interesting. Again one needs to look at the time and foreign policy context in which the ICC 
was established, the court took form in the infancy of South Africa’s democracy as well as in 
a foreign policy context that was intensely focused on international justice and human rights 
(as elucidated above). The country being a forerunner in the establishment of the court came 
as no surprise, Garth Le Pere (2010:29) states that at the heart of the country’s foreign policy 
since the birth of the democracy has been an avowed commitment to multilateralism and 
global governance. Furthermore the author articulates that this is both a normative precept 
and a diplomatic practice, something that is both said and done. South Africa’s leadership 
role aligned itself squarely within the country’s foreign policy ambitions. Ratifying the Rome 
statute was an obvious way in which to further entrench the country’s global human rights 
role and display a vested interest in conflict resolution on the African continent. South 
Africa’s global governance agenda can be divided into various categories according to Le 
Pere, the most relevant in the context of the current discussion is the third category which 
“sets out South Africa’s involvement in global security issues with regard to combating 
terrorism, promoting disarmament and non-proliferation and playing a catalytic role in 
resolving conflict” (Le Pere, 2010:29). South Africa displayed a vibrant energy towards 
international peace and justice from the onset, examples include the leading role that the 
country played in the extension of the Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty and the 1997 Ottawa 
process to ban land mines (Le Pere, 2010:31).    
On the 17th of July 1998 South Africa signed and ratified the Rome statute, a climax in the 
efforts articulated above, the country was the 23rd state party to do so. Later the country 
would domesticate the obligations it had towards the Rome statute; parliament drafted the 
implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  Act 27 of 2002 (the 
ICC Act). This Act was incorporated into law in terms of s 231 (4) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa by enacting the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal court Act 27 of 2002 on the 16th of August.  
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The historical significance of the Act cannot be underestimated. Before it was instituted there 
was no domestic legislation on the above mentioned crimes, considering the country’s 
apartheid past, as spoken of above, it is important that there be clear legislation on crimes 
against humanity. This, according to Grant (2016:21) was a ‘legal lacuna’ .The ICC act was 
created in an effort to allow the national prosecution of the crimes in the Rome Statute. For 
the sake of this project it is significant to note that the preamble of the Act speaks of South 
African Court’s obligation to bring ‘persons who commit such atrocities to justice. In a court 
of law where possible’10. Du Plessis (2008:2) states that “the preamble records that South 
Africa has an international obligation under the Rome Statute, to bring perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity to justice, in a South African court under our domestic law where possible”, 
prosecution by domestic courts is very clearly favoured by the Act. This principle entrenched 
in the Act became a site of tension in later years when the president of Sudan Omar Al-
Bashir, a war criminal, came into the country’s jurisdiction and will be expanded upon later. 
The aims of the ICC Act are threefold. Firstly, in accordance with section 3(a) of the ICC Act 
the aim is the creation of a structure in which the Rome statute may function effectively in 
South Africa, that it function in a genuine sense. Secondly, Section 3 (b) of the Act is an 
alignment aim. This section ensures that what is done with regard to the ICC Act conforms to 
the country’s obligations with the Rome statute. Thirdly, Section 3 (d) is one of the most 
important as it is the site of action, this section allows the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) to prosecute as well as the high courts to adjudicate (as was the case with president 
Omar Al-Bashir) showing that it includes both those inside and outside the borders of the 
country (Du Plessis, 2008:2). These aims are significant in this project because in reality they 
have caused societal tension. 
The formative years of South Africa’s commitment to the ICC: 
The energy of South Africa’s early commitment to the ICC has been characterised as 
‘resilient’ (Grant,2016:21). A strong example of this resilience was when the USA requested 
that a number of countries-Including South Africa- sign their ‘bilateral non-surrender 
agreements’. The essence of this agreement was a promise not to surrender Americans or US 
employees to the ICC. In true American style they added that should a country fail to sign 
                                                        
10 Section 3 of the Act states that of the objects of enabling is as far as possible and in accordance with the 
principle of complementarity ..national prosecuting authority of the republic of prosecute and the high courts of 
the Republic to adjudicate in cases brought against any person accused of having committed a crime in the 
republic and beyond the borders of the republic in certain circumstances. 
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this agreement they would stop the transfer of various resources ranging from aid to military 
assistance. This diplomatic bullying tactic worked for some countries and caused 16 African 
countries which had ratified the Rome statute to buckle to the pressure. There were only four 
African countries that refused this request including South Africa. These countries were the 
‘African refusers’ and it is said that South Africa suffered the greatest loss. The loss suffered 
by South Africa amounted to $8.1 million between 2004 and 2005. Relations between the two 
countries were also frustrated by this decision. In ‘hard’ terms (materially) the loss was 
significant however in more ‘soft’ terms there was something to be gained by a stance of this 
nature. This resolve according to Grant “served as an example of how such resolve could 
further enhance its image as a progressive, rights-promoting state on the international stage. 
The country held a clear view that the agreement amounted to ‘intimidation and diplomatic 
arm twisting’. The courage of a country to stand up to a global hegemon like the USA in this 
manner shows resilience and an avowed commitment to foreign policy principles, this 
decision, I believe, displays strong character. One could argue that South Africa, much like 
other European countries that refused to sign these bilateral agreements had the resources 
which allowed them to not be severely affected by this strong arming tactic. In the case of 
European countries for instance it was a morally dubious act to sign these agreements. Judith 
Kelley (2007:586) articulates that the states that did trusted the administration of justice in 
their own borders and had ‘no doubts concerning the exertion of the rule of law within their 
borders’.   
South Africa and Omar Al-Bashir: A diplomatic conundrum.  
 The ICC extends its jurisdiction to those, who after committing a particular crime are 
subsequently present in South Africa. South Africa faced this troubling situation with the 
arrival of Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir for the 25th ordinary session of the African 
Union on 14 and 15 June 2015. This created a diplomatic conundrum that is of relevance to 
unpack as it weighs heavy on the decision forming the crux of this project. This was the point 
at which South Africa’s commitment to the ICC began to soften .The facts around President 
Al- Bashir are as such: On the 31st of March 2005 the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) adopted Resolution 1593 regarding the situation occurring in Darfur. The UNSC 
took note of the report issued by international commission of inquiry on violations of the 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur, this was subsequently 
referred to the prosecutor of the ICC. The ICC had issued two arrest warrants for president Al 
–Bashir for three simultaneous transgressions namely, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
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and genocide that had been committed in Darfur. Interestingly he is the first sitting president 
to be wanted by the court as well as the first person to be charged with the crime of genocide 
(Ramjathan-Keogh,2017:1).  
I call this a conundrum because the South African government, which is a frontline signatory 
to the Rome Statute took no steps to arrest the Sudanese president. The stance of the 
government as articulated by learned Judge Wallis JA in the case of The minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development v The South African Litigation Centre (SALC)11 was that it 
was not obliged to arrest the president because he enjoyed immunity from such arrest. The 
argument had different aspects worthy of mention, the government contended that they had 
entered into an agreement with the commission of the AU called the ‘hosting agreement’. On 
the basis of this agreement the president had been invited to attend by the AU and not by 
South Africa. Contained within the agreement was an article that specifically referred to 
‘privileges and immunities’12 . Section 5 (3) of the Diplomatic Immunities Act was also used 
by the minister of DIRCO in a ministerial notice published in the government Gazett. This 
notice recognised the hosting agreement for the purpose of granting the immunities and 
privileges contained therein. The issue related to both of the above, it was “whether a cabinet 
resolution coupled with a ministerial notice are capable of suspending the country’s duty to 
arrest a head of state against whom the ICC has issued arrest warrants for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide’.  
The argument on the part of the SALC was obviously the obligations that South Africa had 
with regard to the Rome Statute as well as the Implementation Act. It was their contention 
that as a result of both of these factors the country was under a duty to give effect to the 
request of the ICC to enforce the warrants that had been issued for the arrest of the Sudanese 
president in respect of the crimes mentioned above. The SALC attached to its argument the 
findings that had been made by the pre-trial chambers of the ICC on the 13 of June 2015, it 
stated that the declaration made therein was that South Africa was indeed under duty to arrest 
president Al-Bashir. 
                                                        
11 (2016) ZASCA 17. Para 4 
12 importantly it read “The government shall afford the members of the commission and staff members, 
delegates and other representatives of intergovernmental organisations attending the meeting s the privileges and 
immunities set forth in section C and D, Article V and VI of the general convention of the privileges and 
immunities of the OAU   
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The arguments that were made by the South African government were dealt with decisively 
by the learned judge. His concise and clear articulations on this particular matter are of 
interest to note, the judge stated that:  
“when South Africa decided to implement its obligations under the Rome Statute by passing 
the Implementation Act it did so on the basis that all forms of immunity, including head of 
state immunity, would not constitute a bar to the prosecution of international crimes in this 
country or to South Africa cooperating with the ICC by way of the arrest and surrender of 
persons charged with such crimes before the ICC, where an arrest warrant had been issued 
and a request for cooperation made. I accept, in the light of the earlier discussion of head of 
state immunity that in doing so South Africa was taking a step that many other nations have 
not yet taken. If that puts this country in the vanguard of attempts to prevent international 
crimes and, when they occur, cause the perpetrators to be prosecuted, that seems to me a 
matter for national pride rather than concern”. 
The two South African courts decided that the government had erred in their decision to 
allow the Sudanese president to leave the country without arresting him. The Judges of the 
ICC had also decided that South Africa had erred in its decision (Ngari, 2017). The 
judgement made by the ICC is important-according to Ngari- for two reasons the first is that 
it raises questions about South Africa’s role in international justice and also that it speaks 
volumes in terms of the weak state of the ICC’s tools to ensure that states co-operate with 
their Rome statute obligations. Ideally the ICC should have reported South Africa to the 
UNSC as they are the ones that referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC for investigation. 
This course of action was not chosen and thus South Africa faces no consequences (e.g. 
Sanctions) for going against the court that it signed up to. 
The decision not to arrest Al-Bashir was made with the same energy as many other foreign 
policy decisions in South Africa, executively. Upon reflection, one can sympathize with the 
government in that this instance is not necessarily one in which the public had time to weigh 
in and add weight to the decision. The issue in my opinion comes however in that public 
interest was very evidently not even considered. The governments reason for the decision as 
well as the courts finding that the government erred is proof of this, the judicial system is a 
cornerstone and pillar of our society and its decisions are an adequate yardstick with which to 
measure the amount of public interest consideration. Laws are one of the only steady 
structures of South African society and when the government deviates from the very laws 
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they enacted such as what happened in terms of the ICC Act one cannot simply be left 
comfortable. The fact that commitment to international agreements wanes and that the 
content of an Act was transgressed is worrying. It is in the interest of the public to be led by a 
law-abiding government.  To me there is also something to consider in terms of the impact of 
this decision from an international/western perspective verses from an African perspective. 
The former perspective is the one that has been elucidated a lot, this decision impacts 
negatively on South Africa’s credible status as a bastion of international justice and in my 
view is counter-productive in terms of the foreign policy goal of a permanent seat on the 
UNSC, the soft power implications of a decision such as this one are deeper than the decision 
makers realize. From an African perspective, this decision is coherent with African 
‘solidarity’, a move to arrest a sitting African president might have had a negative impact on 
the country’s peace-keeping efforts in Darfur, one cannot ignore that at every time there were 
South African troops based in Sudan. The possible backlash from the continent is something 
to consider, one has to imagine what instability it could have caused and the effect that it 
would have had on the country’s peace-keeping ambitions on the continent.  
 
Section 2 
South Africa and the decision to leave the ICC: 
The final section of this paper deals with South Africa’s decision to leave the ICC in 2016. 
Up to now this decision has not received deep and broad analysis on as wide a scale as other 
decisions. The aim of this section is to contribute towards the broadening and deepening of 
the analysis of this decision. The manner in which I plan to complete the above-mentioned 
exercise is through a focus on the role of the public within the framework of this particular 
foreign policy decision, by doing so the aim is to fill a knowledge gap and add further 
substantiation to the perspectives of authors such as Siko (2014), Van Wyk (2012), Givisser 
(2008), Nel (2004), Nganje (2014) concerning the character of FPDM. The aim is to add 
more fruit to the tree of knowledge regarding the manner in which foreign policy decisions 
are made in the country.   
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What happened? 
On the 19th of October 2016, the national executive of the South African government took the 
decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, simultaneously the minister of DIRCO took the 
action of signing a notice of withdrawal to give effect to this decision and sent it to the 
Secretary-General of the UN. The effect of this was the triggering of the withdrawal process 
for South Africa13. At this stage it is important to acknowledge that the decision was made 
“without prior announcement by the government, without any public consultation and-most 
vitally-without debate in South Africa’s parliament” (Du Plessis & Mettraux, 2017:362). This 
caveat will be returned to later and forms the core of the matter in this analysis. 
Regardless of the isolated manner in which the decision was made, the government fleshed 
out reasons as to why this course of action was taken. The reasons the decision was made 
happened in the ‘shadow of President Al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa’, this was the 
backdrop of the decision hence it was of relevance to flesh out that conundrum in the above 
section. The relevant part of the statement reads:  
“In 2015, South Africa found itself in the unenviable position where it was faced with 
conflicting international law obligations which had to be interpreted within the realm of hard 
diplomatic realities and overlapping mandates when South Africa hosted the 30th Ordinary 
Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee, the 27th Ordinary Session of the 
Executive Council and the 25th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union (AU 
summit) from 7 to 15 June 2015. South Africa was faced with the conflicting obligation to 
arrest president Al- Bashir under the Rome statute, the obligation to the AU to grant 
immunity in terms of the Host agreement, the general convention of the privileges and 
Immunities of the Organization of African Unity of 1965 as well as the obligations under 
customary international law which recognizes the immunity of sitting heads of state 
This Act and the Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court compel South Africa to 
arrest persons who may enjoy diplomatic immunity under customary international law but 
who are wanted by the ICC for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and to 
surrender such persons to the ICC. South Africa has to do so, even under circumstances 
where we are actively involved in promoting peace stability and dialogue in those countries” 
                                                        
13 Article 127 (1) of the Rome Statute states that “the withdrawal of a party state from the Rome Statute takes 
effect 12 months after the depositing notice of that effect”. What this means is that for South Africa this 
withdrawal would therefore take effect in October of 2017.  
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Du plessis’s assessment of this reasoning is that the government favored impunity over 
responsibility. The reasoning is that the government was caught in a binding situation, one 
end of this bind the government had to observe diplomatic immunity for heads of state. They 
sourced this reasoning from international customary law and backed up by AU pressure. The 
membership of the ICC, according to the government ‘pulled’ them in another direction, one 
requiring of a head of state such as Al-Bashir (Du Plessis,2017:365). Subsequent to the above 
reasons published by DIRCO the minister of Justice wrote the same letter to the speaker of 
the National Assembly as well as the chairperson of the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP). The minister additionally articulated his intention to table a bill that would repeal 
the ICC Act, displaying the veracity of this decision.  The isolated manner in which the 
decisions was made prompted concern on the part of civil society. This lead to the high court 
case of Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and 
others14. The aim of the Democratic Alliance was to seek an order declaring the notice of 
withdrawal as well as the underlying cabinet decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute and 
to deliver the notice to the secretary general of the UN unconstitutional and invalid. They 
sought an order directing the government to be directed to revoke the notice of withdrawal. 
Internationalizing the decision to withdraw from the ICC:  
Christopher Isike and Olusola Ogunnubi (2017:173) make it clear that there is essentially a 
two-pronged implication for the withdrawal, they articulate that the move has ‘dialectical 
implications for South Africa’s putative influence, both in Africa and globally’. What the 
authors articulate here is of great interest and is- in essence- difficult to notice if one looks at 
the issue from one lens or on the surface, you might miss a crucial side of the coin. The 
implications of the withdrawal in Africa and globally are completely divergent, the authors 
provide a more nuanced and balanced perspective of the exit than one focused simply on the 
west’s dissatisfaction with the withdrawal. By doing this the picture is made more whole and 
clear. The reasons provided by the government are given more weight and one can’t help but 
understand why the decision was made albeit disagreement with the manner in which it was 
made  
From a global perspective, South Africa’s decision to leave the ICC had a negative impact on 
the country’s image as champions of human rights and global justice (Isike,2017:173). The 
decision is inevitably at odds with the foreign policy goal of being a country at the forefront 
                                                        
14 Case NO: 831 45/2016. 
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of human rights protection and global justice, this allows room for the credibility of this 
foreign policy goal to be tested. Many have argued that the move has devastating and 
negative effects on the country’s global norm entrepreneurship, however this argument has 
often been limited to the dissatisfaction expressed by the west regarding the move. When one 
looks at the decision from an African perspective the picture is completely recast. The 
decision to a large extent bolstered South Africa’s image as a leader on the continent, one 
knows this through the wave of countries that followed suit in their withdrawal, the likes of 
Kenya, Burundi and Gambia, these countries did what is called “bandwagoning”. The result 
here is that within its sphere of influence the country has gained crucial points because the 
decision displays a substantial representation of Africa’s interests globally. Geopolitically 
South Africa is able to make use of its withdrawal to reaffirm its commitment to Africa and 
to establishing a functional equivalent of the ICC for the continent. The choice as Isike notes 
is between building on its international soft power mileage by remaining a member of the 
ICC or alternatively developing its soft power potential on the continent. 
Interestingly the authors project four possible outcomes of South Africa’s withdrawal. The 
first is that the move opens up the country’s diplomatic relations. The potential here is for the 
move to accelerate AU member state’s ratification of the ACJHR. The second reason, a by-
product of the first, is that it would place the country in good stead to champion the possible 
expansion of the African court’s jurisdiction to include crimes against humanity as well as 
genocide. The third is the bandwagoning articulated above, if the withdrawal is eventuated 
then it is likely to stimulate withdrawal en masse, prompting even those outside the region to 
withdraw. The final likely occurrence is that the withdrawal results in the country hosting the 
establishment of the ACJHR in the country in a similar manner to the way it hosted the Pan 
African Parliament in 2005 (Isike, 2017:176).    
 Localising the decision: 
Of particular relevance and interest to the project at hand are the  domestic dynamics of the 
decision. There were parties that weighed in on the matter; opposing either the decision itself, 
the way it was made or both. The parties of this ‘opposing camp’ included a political party, 
the Democratic Alliance, civil society organisations namely the Council for the Advancement 
of the South African Constitution (CASAC), the South African Litigation Centre (SALC), the 
Centre for Human Rights (CHR) and Amnesty International. Academics such as Professor 
John Dugard and Professor Guenael  Mettraux also had a vested interest in the decisional 
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matrix. On the other side of the spectrum there are three noteworthy parties to whom the 
learned judge in the case refers as ‘the government respondents’. These parties include the 
Minister of DIRCO who signed and delivered the notice for withdrawal, the minister of 
justice who is responsible for administering the national legislation that domesticated the 
Rome Statute as well as the president of South Africa who in terms of s 231(1) of the 
Constitution signs all international agreements15.  
The first and most overarching issue in terms of the decision made relates to the delivery of 
notice of withdrawal without parliamentary approval. The constitutionality of making a 
foreign policy decision in this way is a central question in the current investigation, the 
isolation of the decision in the branch of the executive (through government respondents), 
without the consultation of parliament who act as representatives of the public is to be fleshed 
out.   
The CASAC was established in order to advance the constitution, the way this is done is 
through participation in litigation and advocacy in and on behalf of the public interest. The 
for this reason the CASAC is said to have had ‘direct and substantial interest in the subject 
matter’. The CASAC articulate their mandate as seeking to advance the constitution of the 
country, the constitution in their view, is a platform upon which democratic politics and the 
transformation of society takes place. The organisation adopts and attitude of embracing 
ideas and encouraging debate about how to build a just and equal society where people can 
live in a secure way and with dignity. 
The fundamental issues in the matter at hand are crucial to highlight and are clearly 
articulated by the learned Judge they are as follows: 
“a) whether prior parliamentary approval and the repeal of the implementation Act were 
required before a notice of withdrawal was given (the s 231 argument); (my emphasis- Issue 
1) 
b) whether a process of public participation in parliament should have preceded the logging 
of the notice of withdrawal (my emphasis-issue 2). 
c) whether withdrawal was procedurally rational 
                                                        
15  “The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the National Executive”  
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d) if parliament approval is required for the delivery of the notice of withdrawal, whether 
such approval may be sought after the notice of withdrawal had been delivered (my emphasis-
issue 3) 
e) whether the process based grounds succeed, the substantive grounds should nevertheless 
be considered ; if one issue is dipositive of the matter, should other issues be considered 
f) whether withdrawal is substantively rational (my emphasis-issue 4) 
g) whether the state’s obligations in terms of s 7 (2) of the constitution precludes the 
withdrawal of the Rome Statute altogether16 
h)if the application succeeds on any of the grounds, the just and equitable remedy to be 
granted 
i) The costs”17 
An expansion of the relevant issues: 
The issues highlighted as points of emphasis will be dealt with, although all issues are 
relevant, the main focus in terms of the aim of this project are issues relating specifically to 
the public’s-or representatives of the public’s-participation in the decision or lack thereof.  
Issue number one was a question of whether or not the national executive (specifically the 
government respondents) were allowed to decide on withdrawal without the prior approval of 
the legislature, the ‘legislative approval’ question. Secondarily there was the question of 
whether or not the government could take the action it did without the prior repeal of the ICC 
Act that domesticated the Rome Statute. s 231 of the Constitution is to be made use of as a 
foundation upon which to answer the questions above. This section is of great relevance to 
consider because it stipulates how international agreements are concluded as well as the way 
that they are made binding on the country and domesticated into our law18.   
The learned judges neatly explains the manner in which the section functions. He states that 
“from the exposition of s 231, there is no question that the power to conduct international 
relations and to conclude treaties has been constitutionally conferred upon the national 
executive in terms of s 231 (1)19 . But that power is fettered by s 231 (2) and (4)20 which 
                                                        
16  s 7(2): The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. 
17 Para 31. 
18 Para 32. 
19 The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive 
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enjoins the national executive to engage parliament”21.  Although the National Executive has 
an overarching power, there is an obligation on their part to engage parliament when it comes 
to taking actions that include international agreements. This caveat to the power of the 
national executive is to be expected especially in the context of the South African democracy. 
This I say not only because of the historical exclusion of the public in all governance 
functions but additionally because this decentralized way of decision making is also deeply 
entrenched in South Africa’s foreign policy framework. 
The constitution makes the treaty making process abundantly clear. The contention rises as a 
result of the reverse process of leaving a treaty like the Rome Statute. The opposing parties 
made a strong argument in terms of s 231 (2) of the constitution that since it is parliament that 
must approve the international agreements it follows logically that it is parliament that must 
decide whether or not an agreement stops binding the country prior to the executive 
delivering any notices of withdrawal.  To put it in simple terms, the key that got the country 
in the door of the ICC should be the same key that gets the country out, in this case the locks 
have not been changed.    
The government advanced four key reasons opposing the above view, they saw this ‘reading-
in’ as unwarranted. The first reason was essentially that treaty-making was the exclusive 
competency of the national executive. Secondly and as a by-product of the first reason they 
argued that parliamentary approval was something that was only needed for a treaty to 
become binding. The third reason referred to international law that “in international law a 
notice of withdrawal from an international agreement does not require parliamentary 
approval”22 . The contention here was that to read in the fact that withdrawal carries the same 
criteria as ascension is inconsistent with international law. The fourth reason advanced was 
that parliamentary approval is only required for an international agreement. A withdrawal-
they contended- is a unilateral act and therefore does not qualify as an international 
agreement.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
20 (2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution both inn the 
National Assembly and National council of Provinces. Unless it is an agreement referred to in sub section 3. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by the national 
legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by parliament is law in the 
republic unless it is inconsistent with the constitution or an Act of parliament. 
21 Para 35. 
22 Here counsel for the government made use of article 56v of the Vienna convention on the Law of treaties, 
1969 on which article 127 of the Rome Statute is based. This article excludes parliament from those needing to 
sign a notice of withdrawal.   
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A proper construction of s 231 dictates that a notice of withdrawal is the equivalent of 
ratification which, in terms of s 231 (2) requires prior parliamentary approval.  There is a 
difference in the effect in the two actions in terms of international law. Signing a treaty has 
no direct legal consequences yet withdrawing from one does. It is parliament that keeps the 
power to determine whether or not to remain bound to an international treaty, accordingly it 
is “constitutionally untenable that the national executive can unilaterally terminate the 
agreement”. 
The international agreement is a ‘social contract’ with the people of South Africa. This was 
especially the case considering the domestication part of the agreement. It is stated that 
approval of the international agreement in terms of s 231 (2) of the constitution creates a 
social contract between the people of South Africa, through their elected representatives in 
the legislature and national executive. What comes out of this social contract are certain 
rights and obligations. It follows that it would be strange and make no logical sense if only a 
part of the elected representatives of the people (the executive and not the legislature) were to 
make a decision that effectively has a bearing on the rights and obligations of the people of 
South Africa. Crucially it is articulated that ‘it is trite that where a constitutional or statutory 
provision confers a power to do something, that provision necessarily confers the power to 
undo it as well’. This would be a proper construction of the constitutional obligation and a 
construction that aligns itself squarely with the democratic foreign policy decision making 
professed by the government. 
Public Participation: 
The second important issue of public participation flows well from the first which essentially 
packages the rights of the public to be represented at all stages of foreign policy decisions by 
the full body of their representatives. The national executive, in the manner that they made 
the decision, clearly and obviously circumvented public participation in law-making. Public 
participation in this regard has three highly important effects in a representative democracy. 
The first is that it provides vitality to the functioning of a representative democracy, it is a 
means through which the strength and activity of a democracy can be exercised. Secondly it 
is a way that citizens are encouraged to be involved in public affairs, through it they can 
come to terms with arms of government setting the boundaries of their lives and learn more 
about the laws decided upon and created to which they are called to abide. A third and crucial 
factor is that it enhances and supplements civic dignity for those that decide to participate, 
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even in a home for instance when ones voice is heard and recognised it fortifies as sense of 
dignity, place, belonging and importance23. Public participation in this context is articulated 
as a parliamentary process in law-making. In my view this definition has two categories, one 
being a parliamentary process in localised and domestic law-making, confined to laws 
relating to the parameter of the South Africa’s borders. The concern of this paper is with the 
parliamentary process in law-making that relates to the laws made governing the countries 
international legal obligation, laws circumscribing our foreign policy decision. It is clear from 
the manner in which the decision was made that there was something missing in terms of the 
way the decision was made. 
The result of excluding a vital link (public participation) in the decision made is what is 
termed “procedural irrationality”. The notice of withdrawal was procedurally irrational, in 
order to ‘test’  whether or not procedural irrationality has occurred one needs to ask a few 
questions; Is the action of the government connected to a legitimate government purpose? 
secondarily one ought to ask whether the principle of legality has been followed.  The learned 
judge in the above state case articulates this succinctly in saying that “to determine 
procedural irrationality is to look at the process as whole and determine whether steps in the 
process were rationally related to the end sought to be achieved”24. It was therefore found that 
procedural irrationality lay in the finding that the national executive did not consult 
parliament. It was obliged to do so prior to delivering the notice of withdrawal.  
Of importance to consider in light of this paper are the position that were held by the civil 
society organisations as they held the position of being key actors in the public domain. The 
essence of their positions were rightly characterised as substantive. The CASAC advanced an 
argument that had three arms. The first was that the decision did not align itself with the s 
7(2) of the constitution25 . The second argument articulated that the obligations that the 
country is trying to escape by leaving the Rome Statute are provided for in the constitution. 
The last argument was that the decision amounts to no legitimate government purpose. The 
SALC regarded the decision as one taken in bad faith, they argued further that there was no 
substantial consideration of the effect that the decision would have. The CHR aligned itself 
similarly with what he SALC had stipulated and added that there was no substitute for the 
ICC. Importantly the CHR argued directly against an above mentioned contention of the 
                                                        
23 Doctors for life v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (cc) para 115. 
24 Para 64. 
25 This section state “that the state must respect protect and promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.” 
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government stating that the “African Union Constitutive Act and the African Charter do not 
contemplate a choice between membership of the Rome Statute and promoting peace and 
security. They made a valid observation in stating that the two goals are in a very significant 
sense intertwined, this is because peace and security on the continent does also strongly 
depend on there being ramifications for those that commit crimes against humanity. The 
withdrawal in their view is an indictment to the goal of establishing peace and security. 
One needs to understand that the court did not disagree entirely but had a more nuanced view 
that essentially assists the argument of this paper regarding the fault in South Africa’s foreign 
policy decision making architecture. This nuanced sentiment is worth quoting in its entirety, 
the learned judge articulated that: 
“There is nothing patently unconstitutional, at least at this stage, about the national 
executive’s policy decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, because it is within its 
powers and competence to make such a decision. What is unconstitutional and invalid, is the 
implementation of that decision (the delivery of the notice of withdrawal) without prior 
parliamentary approval. As a result, a declaration of invalidity of the notice of withdrawal, 
coupled with an order for the withdrawal of such notice, should suffice as a just and equitable 
remedy”.   
Conclusion: 
As one evaluates the above mentioned decisions there is a preeminent pattern in terms of the 
manner in which the public’s participation contributes towards the architecture of the 
decisions made. There is strong and conclusive evidence of an active and organised 
representation of the public from the dawn of democratic South Africa until now. This is 
evidenced by the colourful variety of civil society organisations, their interest in foreign 
policy matters and the large extent to which they make an effort to involve themselves in 
decision made. The question that is brought to mind subsequent to reading the above is; what 
do these characteristics- active, organised and the many others associated with the South 
African public- count for in terms of the way foreign policy decisions are considered and 
executed? Is the principle of batho pele of value in a genuine and authentic sense in South 
Africa’s foreign policy decision making architecture? 
The result of the decision forming the crux of this paper-the ICC withdrawal-presents an 
interesting state of affairs and creates a very important precedent. The national executive is 
both within its powers and competencies to makes the decision it made. Once again we see 
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the manner in which the decision was made conflating with the democratic principles on 
which the country’s foreign policy is supposedly built. The difference with this decision is 
that a court of law finally confirmed what theorists had been articulating regarding the nature 
of FPDM in South Africa, the court sealed the unacceptability of making decisions in an 
isolated manner in an open democratic society. The realm of FPDM was brought out of the 
dark corner it had been kept in and into the public light where it should exist in order for the 
process to be truly deemed to carry a democratic character in the sense articulated by the 
policymakers. Again, Poliheuristic theory of decision making considers the domestic 
environment as the essence of the decision. It is further states that ‘the political costs arising 
from the actions of domestic audiences becomes a vital part of foreign policy formulation’. 
This theoretical position is, in essence, the state of affairs that policymakers in a democratic 
dispensation such as South Africa confess but the extent to which it is a true reflection of 
occurrence at the point of foreign policy decision is much more ambiguous. This leaves the 
role of the public in the formation of South Africa’s foreign policy decision making 
architecture tenuous and in dire need of strength. If the government is to maintain democratic 
integrity abroad and the genuine trust of the demos in terms of foreign policy they will need 
to re-evaluate the place of the public in their decision making. Should decisions continue to 
be made in the manner that they often have foreign policy will remain a site at which tension 
maifests.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 Alden, C., 2001, “Solving South Africa’s Chinese Puzzle: Democratic Foreign Policy-
Making and the “Two China’s” Question” in J. Broderick, G. Burford & G. Freer 
(eds),  South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas of  New Democracy, PALGRAVE, 
New York. 
 Alden,C., 2017 ‘ Foreign Decision Making’ in C. Alden and A. Aran (2nd eds.) 
Foreign Policy Analysis; New Approaches, pp 20-42,Routledge.    
 Alden,C., 2017 ‘The domestic sources of foreign policy’ in C. Alden and A. Aran 
(2nd eds.) Foreign Policy Analysis; New Approaches, pp 64-85,Routledge.    
 Black,D.R. (e.d) & Hornsby D.J (e.d)., 2017, South Africa’s Foreign Policy Identities, 
Intentions and directions, Routledge, New York. 
 Breytnbach, W., 1994, The Chinese dilemma: dual recognition in the ultimate 
solution, The South African Journal of International Affairs, 2 (1), 50-61. 
 Broderick,J, (e.d) Burford,G (e.d.) & Freer,G (e.d)., 2001, South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy Dilemmas of  New Democracy, PALGRAVE, New York. 
 Council for the advancement of the South African Constitution, viewed in February 
2018, from http://www.casac.org.za/. 
 Dacey,R.,2004 ‘Traditional Decision Analysis and the Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign 
Policy Decision’ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1),38-55. 
 Department of Defence, 2017, Annual Performance Plan 2017-2018. 
52 | P a g e  
 
  Department of International Relations and Cooperation, ,2017, Revised Strategic 
Plan 2015-2020. 
 Doughetry ,J.,1971 ‘Decision-Making Theories’ in Contending Theories of 
international relations pp 312-326, The Lippincott series in international relations.  
 Freedom House n.d., Freedom World Report, ,viewed March 2018, from 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018. 
 Friedman,S.,2006,’Participatory governance and citizen action in post-apartheid 
South Africa’, International Institute for Labour Studies, DP/164, 1-22. 
 Givisser, M.,2007,Thabo Mbeki The Dream Deferred, Jonathan Ball Publishers (PTY) 
LTD, Jeppestown.  
 Grant,J.A. &Hamilton, S., 2017, “Norm Dynamics and international organisations: 
South Africa in the African Union and International Criminal Court”, in D. Black & 
D.Hornsby (eds),  South Africa’s Foreign Policy Identities, Intentions and directions, 
pp.11-36, Routledge, New York.  
 Headley,j, Van Wyk,J ‘Debating the Public’s Role in in foreign Policy  in James 
Headley, 
 Ibrahim Index of African governance n.d., ‘IIAG Data portal’ and ‘Key findings’ , 
viewed March 2018, from http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/. 
 Johnston, A., 2001, “Democracy and Human Rights Principles and Practices of South 
African Foreign Policy” in J. Broderick, G. Burford & G. Freer (eds),  South Africa’s 
Foreign Policy Dilemmas of  New Democracy, PALGRAVE, New York. 
 K,Vijayyalakshmi., 2017, ‘Poliheuristic Theory and Indian Foreign Policy Decision 
Making: Applicability and Limits’, Global society, 199-219. 
 Koelble,T.,& Lipuma, E., 2008, “Democratizing Democracy: A Postcolonial Critique 
of Conventional Approaches to the ‘Measurement of Democracy’ ”, Democratization  
 Le Pere, G, Vickers,B., 2003 Civil Society and Foreign Policy in P. Nel and J van der 
Westhuizen (eds.), Democratizing foreign policy? : lessons from South Africa, pp. 63-
79, Landham,MD.  
 Le Pere, G., 2010, South Africa’s role in promoting multilateralism and global 
governance, in S.Zondi & L. Masters, the future of South Africa’s foreign policy: 
continuity and change?, 29-35, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand South Africa. 
 N, Mandela, 1998 ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’ Foreign Affairs, 78(5). 
53 | P a g e  
 
 Nel,P et al, 2003 ‘Democracy, Participation and foreign policy Making in South 
Africa’ in P. Nel and J van der Westhuizen (eds.), Democratizing foreign policy? : 
lessons from South Africa, pp. 39-61, Landham,MD.  
 Nganje,F., 2014 ‘Paradiplomacy and the democratisation of foreign policy in South 
Africa’ South African Journal of International Affairs. 21(1),89-107. 
 Nye, J., 2004 ‘Soft Power. The means of success in World Politics’,  PublicAffairs.  
 Pillay,S.R., 2018, “South Africa’s democracy still a model for Africa”, The Daily 
Maverick, 12 March, p 1. 
 Qobo,M. & Nyathi,N., 2017, ‘Ubuntu, public policy ethics and tensions in South 
Africa’ foreign policy’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 23(4), 421-
436. 
 Ramjathan-Keogh,k., 2017 “Op-Ed: The Price of shunning the ICC”, The daily 
Maverick, 06 April, p 1. 
 Reitzig,A, Burton, J.,  (eds.),Public Participation in foreign policy, pp.3-19, palgrave 
MacMillan.    
 S,Van Evra.,1997 ‘Guide to Methods for Students of  Political Science’, Cornell 
University Press,pp7-49. 
 Siko,J., 2014 ‘Inside South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Diplomacy from Smuts to 
Mbeki’. 
 Taylor, I., 2003 ‘The democratization of South African foreign policy: Critical 
Reflections on an Untouchable subject’ in  P. Nel and J van der Westhuizen (eds.), 
Democratizing foreign policy? : lessons from South Africa, pp. 23-37,Landham,MD.  
 Van Wyk,j., 2012 ‘Public Participation in Post-Apartheid South African Foreign 
Policy’ in James Headley, Andreas Reitzig, Joe Burton  (eds.),Public Participation in 
foreign policy, pp.79-99, palgrave macmillan.    
 Warren, M., 2002,’What can democratic participation mean today?’, Political Theory, 
30(5), 677-701. 
 Zondi,S. & Masters,L.,2010,the future of South Africa’s foreign policy: continuity and 
change?, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand South Africa. 
 
 
